The Dismissal of ‘Substance’ and ‘Being’ in Peirce’s Regenerated Logic

After introducing the debate between substance philosophy and process philosophy, and clarifying the relevance of the category of ‘substance’ in Peirce’s thought, the present paper reconstructs the role of ‘substance’ and ‘being’ from Peirce’s early works to his theory of the proposition, provided after his studies on the logic of relatives. If those two categories apparently disappear in Peirce’s writings from the mid-1890s onwards, the account of ‘subject’ and ‘copula’ in Peirce’s analysis of the proposition allows one to grasp the reasons why Peirce omits ‘substance’ and ‘being’ in favor of his three categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness), and to understand why his philosophy cannot be considered as a substance philosophy

Sugerencias en torno a la cosmología: la necesidad de la cosmología en la filosofía de Peirce

The aim of the present paper is to show the need for cosmology in Peirce’s thought. To reach this goal, I first clarify Peirce’s definition of cosmology and its place in the classification of the sciences. Then, I shed slight on the entailment of cosmology in Peirce’s understanding of metaphysics and of logic, and I elucidate these connections in view of Synechism. Finally, in the light of the results achieved through the analysis, I provide a summarily description of Peirce’s cosmology, far from the common interpretation of it.El objetivo del presente artículo es hacer patente la necesidad de una cosmología en el pensamiento de Peirce. Para alcanzar dicho objetivo me propongo clarificar en primer lugar la definición de cosmología de Peirce y su lugar en la clasificación de las ciencias. Luego me propongo arrojar luz sobre la implicación de la cosmología en la concepción de la metafísica y de la lógica de Peirce, y elucidar estas conexiones a la vista de su “Synechism”. Finalmente, a partir de los resultados obtenidos, intento aportar una descripción sumaria de la cosmología de Peirce, distinta de su interpretación habitual.Filosofí

Does Continuity Allow For Emergence?

The present paper proposes an emergentist reading of Peirce, with special reference to his concept of evolution. Although the author never adopts the word “emergence” in a technical manner, it will be demonstrated that the core problem of emergence lies at the heart of his evolutionary doctrine, generally displayed by the interplay of his three well-known categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. Indeed, although the Classical pragmatists most quoted in connection to emergentism are Dewey and Mead (and William James to some degree), scholars have recently suggested some emergentist readings of Peirce’s thought (cf. above all Tiercelin 1998, Quieroz & El-Hani 2006, Rose 2016), in particular with regard to semiotic process and cosmogony. Exploring further the path opened by those researches, the present paper aims to clarify the theoretical problem of emergent evolution from a pragmatist perspective and especially to illustrate Peirce’s emergentist standpoint. In order to reach this goal, the article is divided into four parts: after (1) a brief introduction to the contemporary debates on emergence, (2) I give a historical overview of Classical Pragmatism and British Emergentists, (3) with a special focus on the common roots of the British Emergentists and Peirce on evolution. Finally, (4) I offer an emergentist reading of Peirce’s theory of evolution. In particular, I show how his strong emphasis on chance and the “growth” of the universe go together with his arch-stone of synechism (that is his theory of continuity), through what he calls agapasm

Esperienza ed evento della verità. Pratica filosofica e astrazione scientifica nel pensiero di A.N. Whitehead

Il presente articolo analizza il rapporto tra filosofia, esperienza ed evento nel pensiero di A.N. Whitehead. L’autrice ripercorre e descrive, a partire dalla critica al concetto di oggetto, la peculiare dialettica di astratto e concreto al centro dalle indagini whiteheadiane sull’esperienza percettiva. Successivamente, viene mostrato come la pratica filosofica differisca da ogni genere di scienza, pur necessitandone in virtù della co-implicazione di oggetto ed evento, astrazione e riconoscimento.Experience and event of truth. Philosophical practice and scientific abstraction in A.N. Whitehead's thought This article analyzes the relationship between philosophy, experience and event in A.N. Whitehead’s thought. From the critic of the concept of object, the author retraces and describes the peculiar “abstract-concrete dialectic”, at the center of the researches concerning the perceptual experience.Furthermore, according to Whitehead’s later works, she demonstrates how the philosophical practice is different from all other kinds of science, although it requires science itself because of the co-implication of object and event, abstraction and recognition

How Novelty Arises from Fields of Experience

The relationship between James and Whitehead has been underlined from the very outset by the critical scholarship on Whitehead, as is testified by the presence of articles that appeared before the author’s death. By dissociating myself from the radical interpretation that frames Whitehead’s speculative opus as a systematization of James’s ideas, I survey that confrontation which has been advanced in the last years (Weber 2002, 2003, 2011, Sinclair 2009) in order to provide further contribution, by tackle the problem of novelty. Precisely, I concentrate on those instances, especially the methodological ones, which are not simply akin, but rather properly shared by the authors. In other words, I focus on those grounding ideas from which they endorse a pluralistic universe, conceived in connection with the problem of novelty. Properly, 1) I analyze the way Whitehead refers to James in his books; 2) I compare the roles they acknowledge to reason, in the nexus with the concept of experience; 3) I show the importance both authors ascribe to the problem of novelty, the main topic involved in their efforts to build up new cosmologies

For a Logic of the Event: Language and Philosophy in Process and Reality

Il linguaggio rappresenta uno degli aspetti più caratterizzanti di Processo e realtà e al contempo uno degli scogli più ardui per chi si accinge alla lettura. Per comprendere le ragioni di questa scelta, il presente articolo ripercorre le riflessioni di Whitehead sul linguaggio, sia ordinario che filosofico, per poi approdare ad un’analisi critica del linguaggio di Processo e realtà, tesa a mostrare il nesso profondo che sussiste tra la filosofia dell’evento e le decisioni che l’autore prende a livello lessicale e sintattico.Language represents both one of the most characteristic features of Process and reality and one of the greatest obstacles for the reader. To understand in depth the philosophical reasons why Whitehead adopts such an obscure and complex vocabulary and syntax, the present paper first analyzes Whitehead’s view of ordinary and philosophical language, and then examines the language of Process and Reality in light of such considerations

Hints toward cosmology: the need for cosmology in Peirce’s Philosophy

The aim of the present paper is to show the need for cosmology in Peirce’s thought. To reach this goal, I first clarify Peirce’s definition of cosmology and its place in the classification of the sciences. Then, I shed slight on the entailment of cosmology in Peirce’s understanding of metaphysics and of logic, and I elucidate these connections in view of Synechism. Finally, in the light of the results achieved through the analysis, I provide a summarily description of Peirce’s cosmology, far from the common interpretation of it.El objetivo del presente artículo es hacer patente la necesidad de una cosmología en el pensamiento de Peirce. Para alcanzar dicho objetivo me propongo clarificar en primer lugar la definición de cosmología de Peirce y su lugar en la clasificación de las ciencias. Luego me propongo arrojar luz sobre la implicación de la cosmología en la concepción de la metafísica y de la lógica de Peirce, y elucidar estas conexiones a la vista de su “Synechism”. Finalmente, a partir de los resultados obtenidos, intento aportar una descripción sumaria de la cosmología de Peirce, distinta de su interpretación habitual